Are Bond-Financed Deficits Inflationary? A Ricardian Analysis by Bennett T. McCallum




Working Paper No. 905




Paper presented for Second Peterkin Symposium, "Foundations of
Monetary Policy andGovernmentFinance," Rice University, April
1—2, 1982. The author is indebted to Robert Barro, John Bryant,
Marvin Goodfriend, EdmundPhelps,and Warren Weber for helpful com-
ments,and also to seminar participants at Rice, Penn State,
Michigan State, the University of Pennsylvania, andtheFederal
Reserve Bank of Richmond. The research reported here is part of
the NBER' s research program in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National





This paper considers the possible theoretical validity of the following
"monetarjst hypothesis": that a constant, positive government budget
deficit can be maintained permanently and without inflation if it is
financed by the issue of bonds rather than money. The question is studied
in a discrete-time, perfect-foresight version of the competitive equi-
librium model of Sidrauski (1967), modified by the inclusion ofgovernment
bonds as a third asset. It is shown that the monetarist hypothesis is
invalid if the deficit is defined exclusive of interest payments, but is
valid under the conventional definition. It is also shown that the stock
of bonds can grow indefinitely at a rate in excess of the rate of output
growth, provided that the difference is less than the rate of time preference.
In addition to the main analysis, the paper includes comments on alternative
deficit concepts, a brief consideration of data pertaining to the announced
budget plans of the Reagan administration, and a new look at a much-
studied issue: whether the operation of a Friedman-type constantmoney
growth rule (with non-activist fiscal rules) would be dynamically feasible.
Bennett T. McCallum




Recent developments in U.S. monetary and fiscal affairs have led to
a renewal of interest in issues reminiscent of the "Monetarist vs.
Keynesian" debates of previous decades. In particular, the Council of
Economic Advisers' 1982 forecast of a long string of unusually large
federal budget deficits, together with the Federal Reserve'srepeated
avowals to keep monetary growth rates low, has conferred intense
practical interest upon the question of whether bond-financed deficits
have significant impact on aggregate demand and, thereby, on price level
and/or output magnitudes. The present paper includes a theoretical
discussion of that question and a brief consideration of some relevant
data pertaining to announced policy plans of the Reagan administration.
It also includes comments on alternative deficitconcepts and a new look
at an issue that has been discussed frequently: whether theoperation
of a constant-money-growth policy rule of thetype recommended by Milton
Friedman (1959) (1968) would be dynamically destabilizing.
It should be said at the outset that most of the analysis will be
conducted in a model that is distinctly sympathetic to the monetarist
position, that is, to the idea that bond-financed deficits are not
inflationary. The reason for slanting the analysis in this way is simple:
there seems currently to be very little academic support for the mon-
etarist position, so an interesting question is whether an intellectually
respectable case for that position can be made. Whether the model in fact
conforms to the dictates of respectability is a matter of subjective judge-
ment, but it is at least built upon utility-maximizing behavior of2
individual agents. It is not, however, here subjected to any empirical
testing.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses some
preliminary notions concerning a possible ltRicardianI rationale for the
monetarist position. A Ricardian model is specified in Section III and
the main analytical results are obtained. The above-mentioned instability
issue is then taken up in Section IV. Following that digression, Section V
discusses some points cQncerning the relationship between inflation and
various deficit measures. Next, Section VI compares feasibility con-
ditions derived in Section III with deficit paths implied by announced
policy plans of the Reagan administration. Finally, Section VII provides
a brief conclusion.3
II. Analytical Issues
In order to limit the issues at hand in a manageable fashion, it will
be presumed throughout the formal analysis that the economy can be repre-
sented by a deterministic, aggregative, flexible-price, equilibrium model.
For some issues, such a model might be inadequate or misleading. Our
present concern, however, involves the influence on inflation rates of
a policy stance maintained over a number of years. For that type of
concern, a flexible-price equilibrium model--which presumes that aggre-
gate demand effects are manifested primarily in price level or inflation
responses--seems well-suited.
As a matter of terminology--and to sharpen the issues-- let us define
a monetarist viewpoint as one which asserts that bond-financed deficits
have no effect on aggregate demand. More precisely, our monetarist
hypothesis is that, for given time paths of the money stock and government
spending, it does not matter for aggregate demand whether the necessary
revenue is raised by taxation or by bond sales. In other words, bond-
financed changes in tax receipts have--according to the monetarist
hypothesis--no effects on the price level or on output.
At this point, it perhaps needs to be asked whether there is
explicable reason to believe that the monetarist hypothesis (as defined)
might be correct. Discussions in the most well-known references notwith-
1/
standing,the main intellectual support for such a position seems to
beprovided by the "Ricardian equivalence theorem,t' which obtains insome
models inwhich infinite-lived agents correctly take account of the
effects on future budgets of current budgetary actions. With fixed time
paths of government spending and money creation, any bond-financed change4
in current taxes implies changes in future interest payments to be made
by the government. If these are to be financed by Lump-sum taxes and
if the government and private agents face the same market interest rates,
then the change will have no effect on a representative private agent's
intertemporal budget constraint. Under such conditions, then, a bond-
financed change in taxes will have no effect on the agent's supplies or
demands and, consequently, no effect on the price level or output--just
as predicted by the monetarist hypothesis.
The foregoing statement of the Ricardian result presumes that agents
have infinite life spans, which is obviously untrue. But, as is well-
known, Barro (1974) has demonstrated that an economy of finite-lived
agents who care about the utility of their offspring or parents may, under
reasonably general conditions, be treated for analytical purposes as one
2/
with infinite-lived agents.Consequently, this feature of the analysis
3/
seems acceptable, given the aims of this investigation.
A second crucial assumption of the Ricardian analysis is that agents
are cognizant of effects on their own intertemporal budget constraints
of governmental debt issues. But this assumption is merely a particular
application of the hypothesis of rational expectations, the merits of
4/
which have been detailed extensively elsewhere.
Other complicating aspects of reality--uncertainty, distribution
effects, multiple interest rates--are also ignored in the Ricardian
equivalence argument. But the same is true of most policy-oriented
theoretical analyses of macroeconomic phenomena. As there is no apparent
reason why the issue at hand requires a different type of treatment, it
5/
would seem satisfactory to neglect them here, as elsewhere.5
The discussion to this point seems to suggest that bond-financed
deficits could be non-inflationary. Each bond issue/tax reduction
ackage has no impact on aggregate demand or the price level, so
a sequence of bond-financed tax reductions should apparently have no
impact on the inflation rate. But it is possible that the situation
is different in the case of a permanent deficit, financed by in-
definitely-continuing issuance of bonds. In that case, as the deficit
continues the outstanding bond stock continues to grow. So,
accordingly, does the interest that must be paid each period on the
outstanding stock. If, for example, the magnitude of the real deficit
(net of interest payments) is kept at d, the real bond stock b will be
required to grow according to
(I) b =(l+r)bi+ d(l+r),
if the real rate of interest is constant at the value r. Thus the bond
stock will in this case grow without bound; if d >0, b- as
Barro(l976)(l981) has argued that under these circumstances the
Ricardian equivalence argument breaks down. In particular, he suggests
that the rate of growth of the bond stock cannot exceed the economy's
rate of output growth--here temporarily taken to be zero--because "the
value of the outstanding stock of debt at any point in time is bounded
by the government's ...presentvalue of future taxing capacity" (1976,
p. 343). In a similar vein, Sargent and Wallace (1981) have argued that
"if the interest rate on bonds is greate than the economy's growth rate,
the real stock of bonds will grow faster than the size of the economy.
This cannot go on forever, since the demand for bonds places an upper6
limit on the stock of bonds relative to the size of the economy"
6/
(1981, p.2).
These arguments do not, however, seem entirely convincing. First,
if the bond-issuance policy is permanently maintained, then taxes will
never have to be collected so the relevance of inadequate taxing
capacity is unclear. And under the Ricardian view, government bonds
are not regarded as net wealth to the private sector, so the size of
—7/
the bond stock also seems to be potentially irrelevant.
But whether or not the cited arguments by Barro and Sargent-Wallace
are subjectively convincing, analysis indicates that the basic idea
behind their contention is, as a matter of theory,correct. To develop
that analysis is the math objective of the next section. As itturns out,
however, the precise statements quoted above--and the implied limitations
on bond demands--are not correct.7
III. Analysis
Our first task is to specify a maximizing model that incorporates
the crucial component of the Ricardian view, namely, infinite-lived
agents who correctly take account of the government budget constraint.
The model must also be one that accomodates money, bonds, and a physical
asset. To that end, let us adopt a discrete-time, perfect-foresight
version of the well-known model of Sidrauski (1967), modified to include
&J2J
government bonds.In order to keep matters as simple as possible, let
us first consider a version with no depreciation or population growth.
Formally, we imagine an economy composed of a large number of
similar households, each of which seeks at period t to maximize
(2) u(c,m) + u(c+i,m+u(c÷2,m2) +
Here c is consumption in period t andm = withMt the household's
nominal money stock at the start of t and the price of the (single)
consumption good in t. The within-period utility function u is assumed
to be well-behaved so that unique, positive values are chosen forc
and m÷i, t =1,2 The discount factorequals lI(l+5), with the
time-preference parameter '5 positive.
Each household has access to a production function that is homoge-
neous of degree one in its inputs, labor and capital. But since labor
is supplied inelastically, this function can be writtenas f(kt),
where k is the stock of capital held at the start of t. Thefunction
f is assumed to satisfy the conditions V > 0, f" <0, f'(O) =, and
f'() =0.Thus a unique, positive value will be chosen fork in8
each period. Capital is simply unconsumed output, so its price is
the same as that of output and its real rate of return between t
and t+l is f'(ki).
Each household has the opportunity in t of purchasing government
bonds at a money price of Each bond is redeemed in t+l for one
unit of money, so the nominal rate of return on bonds between t and
t+l is = Thereal rate r is then defined by l+rt =
(l+R)/(l+rr).
Finally, lump-sum transfers net of taxes in the
amount v are distributed to (or, if negative, collected from) the
household in period t. Consequently, the household's budget con-
straint for period t can be written as
(3) f(k) + v =c+ (l+rr) m1 -m+ (l+r) b÷i_ b +
where IT = - isthe inflation rate and b =B/P
with
Bt ￿0the number of bends held at the start of t.
Given this setup, we can derive optimality conditions for the agent
by writing the Lagrangian expression
L t-l [u(ctmt) + + V- C -(l+)m÷i+
bt+l + bt -k1+ kJl,
obtainingKuhn-Tucker conditions, and then letting T—- . Becauseof
our assumptions that cn÷1, and k÷i will be strictly positive, the
conditionsassociated with those variables can be written as equalities
holding for all t=1,2 Theyare:9
(4) ui(ct,m) -X=0
(5) u2(c÷i,mi) -X(l+rr)+ =0
(6) + X1 (f'(ki) + ii =0.
The condition associated with bt÷l must, however, be written in two
parts, as follows:
(7a) -X/(l+r) '-i- 0
(7b) bt+l [t/(l+r) +X]
=0.
Finally, from the condittons relevant to mT÷l bT÷l, and kTl we obtain--
as explained in the appendix-—the transversality conditions




(lOs)urn T-l XT/(l+r)￿ 0
T-*
(lOb) lirnb1T-l XT/(l+r )= 0.
T-
Conditions (3)-(l0) govern the agent's choices of c, k1,m+1, b1,
and X, given initial asset stocks and time paths of prices and transfers.
Before continuing, let us pause to note that, because of our
assumptions on u, will be positive for all t. Also, (6) and (7)
together imply that r =f'(k÷i)whenever bt+l > 0; the rates of return10
on bonds and capital are the same if any bonds are demanded. Further-
more, if it happens that ?t+l = aswill be the case in a steady
state, then each of these rates of return will equal 3 (provided that
b is positive). t+1
Next we consider the government's budget. Expressing all quanti-
ties in per-capita terms and letting denote government purchases of
output, we have the identity
(11) Mt+l -+ QtBt+i
-B
=P(g+ v)
or, in real terms,
(12) (l+Tr) mi -m+ (l+r) bt+l -b=g+Vt.
The government's choices of time paths forMt Bt and v must con-
form to (11) and (12).
Given time paths for three of the policy variables, equilibrium




In particular, if time paths for M, and v are selected by the
government, conditLons (3),(4),(5),(6),(7),(12), and (13) will determine
paths for c1, k, bt, r, X ,andm.
We now have enough results to demonstrate that the Barro-Sargent-
Wallace claim is correct, provided that the deficit is defined exclusive
of interest payments on current debt. More specifically, we can show
that the model at hand will not support a zero-inflation equilibrium in11
which a permanently-maintained positive deficit of+ v =dis
financed entirely by bond sales. To do so, we first observe that this
rnonetaristhypothesis implies that (l+rr) m+i =0and that
steady-state conditions prevail for all variables except bt so that
11/
rtand are constant, with r =5> 0and >0Then we insert the
hypothesized constant values in (12), obtaining
(14) bt÷l =(l+r)b + (l+r)d t=1,2
Next we note that the latter implies
(15)bi =(1+r)tb1+ (l+r)d [1 +(l+r)+...+(l+r)thl,
which in turn implies
(16) bT+l XT/(1+rT) =Xb1+ Xd [(l+r) -(l+r)lT]/r.
Butitcan then readily be seen that the expression in (16) approaches
Xb1 +Xd(l+r)/r as which violates condition (lob). Equivalently,but
in different words, bT÷l grows at the rate r while decays at
the rate 6 =r,so their product grows at the rate zero--i.e., does not
vanish as T increases. Thus the proposed monetarist path cannot be
12 /
anequilibriurn.
It should be noted, however, that a constant, maintained deficit
13 / canbefinanced entirely by bond sales with no resulting inflation
if "deficit" is defined--as it typically is--to include current interest
payments. To make this argument, let us define the issue value of bonds
outstanding at tby =B/(l+Ri).
Then with -= 0,the12





Now assume that policy keeps the real value of the right-hand side of
(17) constant at d, so that
(18)t+l
=d
Next we conjecture that, with d, g, and N held constant, the price
level will also be constant so that (18) becomes
(19) bt1 -b=d(l-i-r).
But in this case we have
(20) bt+l =b1+ [1 + 1 + ••+1tl1 (l+r) =b+dt(l+r),
so that
(21) bT÷lT-lXT/(1+rT) =tXb1 +Xd T(l+r)]/(l+r)T,
which does approach zero as T—- .
Toverify that a non-inflationary steady state is also consistent
with the other relevant conditions, we argue as follows. Given values
for d and g, steady-state values of k, m, c, and X are determined by (4),
(5), (6), and (13). With bt > 0 for all t,then,equation (7a) holds as
an equality and determines r. Conditions (8) and (9) are satisfied with
constant values for rn, X, and k since T-10 as Finally, with
constant m and ii= 0,v =(1÷r)bt+1 -b
-gby (12), so (3) reduces
to (13).13
The policy rule in the last example is one which makes b grow
at a rate that decreases over time, approaching zero in the limit.
Let us next consider an example in which b grows at a constant,
positive rate that is numerically smaller than ô. For simplicity,
let us suppose that the rate is 5/2. From our previous discussions
it is clear that in this case condition (lOb) is not violated.
Furthermore, it can be readily verified that conditions (3)-(lOa)
are all satisfied by constant values of c, k, m, r, A, and iT= 0.
The behavior of v in this case satisfies
(22) g + v =(1+r)1(1+5/2) bt -bt
=[(l+5/2)(l+5)-1l] bt =-(5/2)(l+5)b
so d =g+ v is negative and decays at the rate 5/2. The alterna-
tive (conventional) deficit measure =dt+Sbtis positive, however,
and grows at the rate 5/2. Thus we see that the conventionally-
defined deficit can--in the Ricardian/monetarist Sidrauskj model--
grow forever without causing inflation. Furthermore, we see that the
real stock of bonds can grow forever at a rate exceedthg zero--which
is, in this instance, the growth rate of the economy.
It appears, furthermore, that the foregoing conclusions are not
necessarily affected by population growth. Specifically, suppose that
as in Sidrauski (1967) the size of each household grows at the rate n
and that the utility function remains as in (2) withc and now
measuring per-capita values. Then, with all other quantities also
expressed in per-capita terms, the household budget constraint..becomes14




One relevant effect is that the counterpart of (7) now implies that
(l+n)(l+r)1 =(l+ô)1if bt >0and =+1
Another is that
condition (lOb) is replaced with
(lOb') urn bT÷lT-l X( n)/(1+r) =0.
T-*





Consequently, if the per-capita magnitudes v, and Mt are
held constant over time--so that the aggregate deficit d and money stock
each grow at the rate n in every period--the following equation will
14/
govern the behavior of b under the monetarist hypothesis:
(14') bt+l =(l+r)(l)b + (d-)(l+r)(l).
Thus the per-capita bond stock grows at the rate (1+r)(l+n) -1.
But since l+r equals (l+n)(1+'5) in the hypothesized steady state,
bT+l then grows at the rate Ô which equals the rate at which 3Tl
contracts. So the product bT÷l T-l grows at the rate zero. This
violates (lOb) as in our first example with n =0.But it just
violates (lob), so it is clear that the second and third examples,
in which the per-capita bond stock grows at a diminishing rate that
approaches zero and at a constant rate less than 6 (respectively),15
will not violate (lOb').
Allowing proportional depreciation of capital would leave the
crucial relationship between 6 and the growth rate of bonds unchanged.
The marginal product of capital would exceed r by the amount of the
depreciation rate, but the steady-state condition 1+r =(l+6)(l+n)
would continue to hold and it is the relationship between r and 8
that governs the relative growth rates of bT÷l and T-l
From the cases considered, then, we reach the following con-
clusions regarding bond-financed deficits in a Ricardian/monetarist
economy:
(i) A permanent per-capita deficit cannot be financed solely
with bonds if the deficit is defined exclusive of interest payments.
(ii)A permanent per-capita deficit can be financed solely with
bonds, and without inflation, if the deficit is defined inclusive of
interest payments.
(iii) It is feasible to maintain a positive growth rate of real
bonds per capita, but this growth rate must be smaller than the rate of
time preference.
If output grows only as a result of population growth, the per-capita
growth rates in these three statements can be interpreted as aggregate
15 /
growthrates measured relative to aggregate output growth.16
IV.Instabilitywith a Friedman-Type Policy Rule
Thereexists a sizeable body of literature concerningpotential
"instability" under a policy regime in which taxes are collected
according to aproportional (or progressive) schedule, rather thanin
a Lump-sum fashion. In particular, authors including Blinder and
Solow(1976),Christ (1979), Scarth (1980), Turnovsky (1977) and others
haveargued that the macroeconomic system will exhibit dynamic in-
stability due to explosive bond growth if the government adoptsa policy
regime of the type championed by Milton Friedman (1968): one that
makesthe moneystock grow at a constant rate and prohibits endogeneous
responsasof government spending or income tax schedules. This diffi-
cultyarises, it shouldbe emphasized, even when these schedules are
designedto yield a balanced budget in the steady state. From the
analysis of Section III it appears that explosive behavior of the
bond stock would indeed prevent the attainment ofequilibrium, so an
examination of the issue seems warranted,
For this analysis we shall retain the model of Section III, but now
assumethat (proportional) taxes are levied at the rate ¶onproduction
and interest received from the government. In per-capita terms, real
taxes during period t are then r[f(k) +ri be].For simplicity,
let the transfer component ofv be zero. Then the per-capita
government budget identity becomes
(23) (l+n)(l.fr)m1 -m+(l+n)(1+r)1b1 -b
=- T[f(k)+r1b].
Now we impose the Friedman policy rule byrequiring M and to be17
constant over time, and we hypothesize the existence of a steadystate




It is also assumed that 1isset at a zagnitude that permits b to
remain constant at some chosen value. But ifbt ever departs from
that value, its behavior will be described by
(25) b+i =(l+r)(l-Tr)(l+ct)b + constant
17/
so that dynamic stability prevails only if (l+r)(l-'rr) < (l+i).
To see whether that condition would obtain in the monetarist
steady state, we nextexamine the household's choice problem under the
revisedbudget constraint, which is
(26) (l-T)f(k) =c+(l+n)(l+rr)tn-
—l +(l+n)(l+r)btl -b+¶r1b +(l+n)'t+l k.
The optimality conditions that are thecounterparts of (6) and (7a)
arenow
(27) —(1+ri) + Xt [(l—r) f'(k1) + 1] =0
(28) -(l+n)(l+r)1 X ++1 (l-r) < 0.
Using the strict equality in the latter, we then see that a steady
statewith positivebond holdings implies
(29) (l+r)(l-Tr) =(1+ri)(l).18
Consequently, we see that (l+r)(l-rr) >(l+n)so that (25) is dynamically
unstable. Ifbt
ever departs from the constant value associated with
¶,itwill growat the rate 6, just as in the first example of Section III.
And the relevant transversality condition is again
(lOb')limbTlT-lT (l+n)/(l+rT)
0
sothat path is not an equilibrium. Thus the analysis implies that the
Friedman rule is unsatisfactory in the following sense: any departure
of b from its intended constant value will place the system on an
t 18/
infeasible path.
The foregoing argument contradicts the conjecture in McCallum
(1981, p.137), where it is suggested that the presence of growth and
taxes would tend to produce stability in the behavior of bonds per unit
of output. In that paper an equation similar to (25) is utilized, but
it is suggested that r would tend to equal n in the steady state. Here
we see that suggestion to be incorrect: in the present model, the after-
tax real rate of interest is approximately equal to the rate of growth, a,
plus the rate of time preference, 6.
Consequently, the suggestion in the last paragraph of McCallum (1981)
assumes a heightened importance. In order to implement a non-discretionary
andnon-activist set of monetary and fiscal policy rules,as is often
recommendedby Friedman and other monetarists, it would seem to be prefer-
able tosetthe growth rate of3, ratherthan Mt at some constant value.
Witha fixed tax schedule and a fixed path for cyclically-induced
deficits and surpluses would then be automatically financed by changes
in the stock of money. From the perspective of dynamic stability, the
"monetary and fiscal framework" originally proposed by Milton Friedman
(1948) appears to be superior to the one promoted inhis later writings
(1959)(1968).19
The observation of the lastparagraph, that Friedman originally
proposed a constant bond-growth rule, leadsone naturally to ask what led
to his change of position. The onlyexplanation I have been able to
find in Friedman's writings is asfollows:
I have become increasingly persuaded thatthe [1948] proposal
is more sophisticated and complex thanis necessary, that
a much simpler rule would also producehighly satisfactory
results and would have two greatadvantages: first, its
simplicity would facilitate the publicunderstanding and
backing that is necessary if the rule is toprovide an
effective barrier to opportunistic"tinkering"; second, it
wouldlargely separate the monetary problem from thefiscal
and hence would require lessfar-reaching reform over a narrower
area. (Friedman, 1959, p.90)
From this I would infer that Friedman's
change in position resulted not
from economic considerations but froma belief that it would be easier,
politically, to achieve adoption of themoney-stock rule in the United
States. In particular, less cooperationbetween the monetary and fiscal
authorities would be required. But
now that Friedman (1982, pp. 114-118)
has concluded that the incentive
structure facing Federal Reserve officials
is not conducive to effectivemonetary control, and that improvedper-
formance probably requires termination ofthe independence of the Fed,
this rationale for the second-best ruleseems less satisfactory.20
V.Measures of the Deficit
Previous sections have mentioned two possible definitions of the real
deficit, dt =+v
and the more conventional cI =÷ v+Rtl.
(Here we ignore population growth.) Recently, a number of writershave
suggested that a more appropriate concept would be the change in thereal




=g+v -b R -ii(m+b ), ttt t-l tt+l t+l
which subtracts from the conventional measure the capital gains to the
government (losses to the public) that result from inflation. This concept
incorporates an entirely sensible adjustment, one that helps to produce a
measure that more accurately reflects real resource flows between the
government and the private sector. There are, however, two pointsthat
need to be made concerning the measure
First, if one is discussing a Ricardian economy it seems inappropriate
to include the bond component
- Asthe discussion in Sections II
and III indicates, changes in b or b unaccompanied by changes in N or g
have no effects on private supplies or demands in this type of economy.
Such changes do not, therefore, give rise to resource transfers to or from
the government. And from the balance sheet point of view, changes in b
that have no effect on private wealth--as the Ricardian result is often
expressed--should not be regarded as altering the liabilities of the
government. In a Ricardian economy, therefore, a better measure of the




thechange between periods tandt+l in the real value of the stock of
(high-powered) money. The difference in treatment between bonds and money
implied by this definition is appropriate because changes in real money
holdings do, in contrast with those for bonds, give rise to supply-demand
adjustments and resource transfers. In the Sidrauski setup these come
about becausem is an argument of u. More fundamentally, the idea is
that transaction cost economies provided by holdings of the medium of exchange
alter the consumption/leisure possibilities faced by individualagents.
The second point to be made applies to d as well as d--indeed, it
is most transparent in an economy in which there are no bonds.. There the
point is that d*, i.e., the period-t change in real money balances
-
cn.is not a useful measure of the inflationary impact of the period's
fiscal/monetary actions. It is the percentage change in nominal money
balances (corrected for output growth, of course) that measures the in-
flationary potential of those actions. As is familiar from discussions of
hyperinflationary experiences, real money balances will generally be falling
over time during periods of increasing inflation rates, even though the
inflation is entirely due to increasing rates of growth of nominal money
stocks. Alternatively, the measure d* willobviously equal zero in an
inflationary steady-state, whatever the rate of inflation.
Turning to economies with money and bonds, we first note that if the
** *
economyis Ricardian, d is preferred tod and the argument is just as
above. If, on the other hand, the economy is notRicardian, the inflationary
impact of a given percentage change in M+B will dependupon the mix of money
and bonds. Thus no single measure will be fully adequate. If one22
nevertheless seeks a single measure, a natural point of reference is pro-
vided by the case of equiproportionate issues of N and B, in which case
the ratio of N to B does not change. In that case the point is that
d is not a good measure of the inflationary impact of the N-plus-B
issue, even if scaled and corrected for output growth. The basic reason
is the same as for the no-bonds economy; it is the groth of N-I-B, not
m+b, that is relevant for the generation of inflation.23
VI. Reagan Administration Plans
Let us now briefly attempt to determinewhether the results of
Section iii imply that themonetary and fiscal policy plans of the
Reagan administration__as of early l982--areinconsistent, in the sense
of requiring an infeasible path for thestock of government bonds.
The values of the planned federalbudgetdeficits for 1982-87
announced by the Council of Economic Advisers(1982, p.98) are as
follows:
Fiscal Federal Budget Deficit Year
$billion ,ofGNP
1982 118.3 3.8 1983 107.2 3.1 1984 97.2 2.6 1985 82.8 2.0 1986 77.0 1.7 1987 62.5 1.3
Here we see that, although the deficit
magnitudes are large by historic
standards, they decrease each year as a fractionof GNP. Thus the
deficits as forecast by the CEA donot imply monetary-fiscal inconsis-
tency, even if per-capita money growth is takento be negligible.
But of course these forecasts are
sensitively dependent upon the
forecast values of output andinflation, and the CEA's forecast values
for those variables are highly
optimistic. In the following table, the
output growth and inflation values forecastby the CEA are compared with
"assumptions" used by the CongressionalBudget Office (CBO) in preparing








Here the deficit does not fall, as time passes, as a percent of GNP.
Furthermore, the CBO describes alternative projections based on relatively
"optimistic" and "pessimistic't assumptions regarding output and inflation.
Under the latter alternative, the deficit increases steadily in relation
to GNP, reaching 7.47. in 1987 (CBO, pp.15-16).
From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that it is difficult to
be confident about the inconsistency possibility, one way or the other.
And of course the relevant transversality conditions in our model apply
only in the limit so, strictly speaking, six years of forecasts can not
OutputGrowth, CPI Inflation,7.
Year CEA CBO CEA CB0
1982 3.0 -0.1 6.6 7.5
1983 5.2 4.4 5.1 6.9
1984 4.9 3.6 4.7 6.9
1985 4.6 3.5 4.6 6.4
1986 4.3 3.5 4.6 6.0
1987 4.3 3.5 4.4 5.7
This difference in assumptions about macroeconomic
leads to large discrepancies in deficit forecasts, even
assumptions regarding spending rules and tax schedules.












be conclusive whatever the magnitudes. Perhaps the bestway to think of
the issue, consequently, is as follows. The tax legislationembodied by
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 is scheduled to introduceindexing
in 1985, thereby eliminating "bracket creep" resulting frominflation.
In addition, progressivity was markedly reduced. As a firstapproximation,
then, one might view the relevant tax structure for theperiod beginning
in 1985 as one in which a constant fraction of realoutput is collected
by the Federal government in taxes. The crucial issue, then, is whether
government spending will be similarly curtailed. If, instead, spending
rises as a fraction of output, inconsistency would result.26
VII.Conclusions
To a certain extent, the analytical results described above provide
support for the monetarist position. In particular, we have seenthat
it is possible to construct a utility-maximizing model in whichbond-
financed deficits are not inflationary if the bond stock does not grow
too rapidly. Furthermore, the model's restriction on bond growth permits
a permanently-maintained, positive per-capita deficit, providedthat the
deficit is measured (as is conventional) as inclusive of interest
payments. And the model places no upper bound on theratio of bonds to
output.
On the other hand, it is also true that the model places strict limits
on the extent of bond sales, and these limits imply that a constant non-
inflationary per-capita deficit is not feasible if the deficit ismeasured
exclusive of interest payments. These limits obtain, moreover, in a model
that is designed to be highly sympathetic to the monetarist position. Thus
21/
the results are not unreservedly supportive of the aionetarist position.
In addition, it is shown that when a zero per-capita money stock growth
rule is combined with a constant per-capita level of government purchases
and a constant proportional tax schedule, the implied behavior of the bond
stockis dynamically infeasible. If this Friedman-type policy rule is
considered "monetarist," then anadditionalunsupportive result is obtained.
Inany event, the analysis suggests that Friedman's original proposal(1948)--
in which bond growth is held constant and money issued or returned over the
cycle to satisfy the government budget identity--is superior tothe one
promoted in his more recent writings.27
Appendix
The object here is to describe in more detail the derivation of the
optituality conditions for the individual household. We take the most
general conditions described in the body of the paper, those in which
the household's population grows at the rate n and taxes are imposed on
income. Thus the objective function is (2) and the budget constraint (26).
We begin with a version in which the household has a planning horizon of
T periods. Thus the relevant Lagrangian expression is
(A-l)L [u(ct,mt)+ Xf(l_T) f(kt) -c
-(l-4-n)(l+rT)m+ m -(l+n)(l+r)1bt+l + bt _Tr1b
-
(l÷n)k÷1+ k1].
Itis assumed that u and f have properties such that the Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions are necessary and sufficient for a maximum. These are:
(A-2)ui(c,m) - = t=l,...,T
(A-3)u2(ct÷i,m+1) —X(l+n)(l+rr) + _xt+l =0 t =1,..
(A-4)-(l+n) + t+l [(l_)f'(k+1) + 1] =0 t =
(A-5a)_(l+n)(l+r) > + +l (l_Tr) < 0 t =
r -l
(A-5b) b÷1 L_(l÷n)(l+r) + (l-Tr)j
=0 t =1,...,T-l
Here the first three are written as equalities because the household will
choose positive magnitudes for m÷1, and kt1 for t =1,...,T-l. The
optimal value for some be's may be zero, however, so the two-part condition28
is required. Also relevant are values of mT+l, kT÷l, arid bT+l. The
household would like each of these to be negative (and large in absolute
value) but non-negativity requirements pertain. Thus we have the two-
part conditions:
(A6) _T-1 XT T)(l+n)< 0, mT+lT-1XT(l+iiT)(1i-n) =0
(A-7)_T-lXT(li-n) < 0, kT+lT-lXT(l+n) =0
(A-8)_T-lXT(l÷rT) (1-i-n) < 0, bT÷lT-1XT(l+rT) (1÷n) =0.
Finally, to obtain conditions for the infinite-horizon assumption we
let In this case (A-2)-(A-5) become applicable for all t =1,2,...
while (A—6)—(A-8) hold in the limit. In the body, the first parts of
(A-6) and (A-7) are ignored, since with > 0 they will be satisfied
automatically. By setting n =0and ¶=0,the above conditions collapse
to those presented in (4)-(l0). Also applicable, of course, are the
budget constraints relevant for each t =1,2Re ferences
Barro, Robert J., "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?" Journal of Political Economy
82 (Nov./Dec. 1974), 1095—1117.
_______________"Replyto Buchanan and Feldstein," Journal of Political Economy
84 (April 1976), 343-349.
_______________"ThePublic Debt," Chapter 6 of Macroeconomic Analysis, September
1981.
Blinder, Alan S., and Robert M. Soloc.z, "Does Fiscal Policy Still Matter? A Reply,"
Journal of Monetary Economics 2 (November 1976), 501-510.
Brunner, Karl, and Allan H. Meltzer, "An Aggregate Theory for a Closed Economy,"
in J.L. Stein, ed., Monetarism. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976.
Bryant, John, and Neil Wallace, "A Suggestion for Further Simplifying the Theory of
Money," Research Department Staff Report 62, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
December 1980.
Christ, Carl F., "On Fiscal and Monetary Policies and the Government Budget Restraint,"
American Economic Review 69 (September 1979), 526-538.
Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, Baseline Budget Projections
for Fiscal Years 1983-1987. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1982.
Drazen, Alan, "Government Debt, Human Capital, and Bequests in a Lifecycle Model,"
Journal of Political Economy 86 (June 1978), 505-516.
Friedman, Milton, "A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability," American
Economic Review 38 (June 1948), 245-264.
_______________AProgram for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordhaxn University
Press, 1959.
________________"NorietaryPolicy: Theory and Practice," Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking 14 (February 1982), 98-118._______________"TheRole of Monetary Policy," American Economic Review 58 (March
1968), 1-17.
Gordon, Robert J., ed., Milton Friedman's Monetary Framework: A Debate with His
Critics: (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
Gray, Jo Anna, and Stephen W. Salant, "Transversality Conditions in Infinite Horizon
Models," UnpubLished, 1981.
McCallum, Bennett T., "On Macroeconomic Instability from a Monetarist Policy Rule,"
Economic Letters 1 (1978), 121-124.
____________________"Rational.Expectations and Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy:
An Overview," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 12 (November 1980, Part 2).
___________________MonetaristPrinciples and the Money Stock Growth Rule,"
American Economic Review 71 (May 1981), 134-138.
______________________"TheRole of Overlapping-Generations Models in Monetary
Economics," Carnegie-Mellon University, March 1982.
Sargent, Thomas J., Macroeconomic Theory, New York: Academic Press, 1979.
Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace, "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5 (Fall 1981), 1-17.
Sidrauski, Miguel, "Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary Economy,"
American Economic Review 57 (May 1967), 534-544.
Siegel, Jeremy, "Inflation-Induced Distortions in Government and Private Saving
Statistics," Review of Economics arid Statistics 61 (February 1979), 83—90.
Stein, Jerome L., Morietarism. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1976.
Tobirt, James, "Stabilization Policy Ten Years After," Brookings. Papers on
Economic Activity (No.1, 1980), 19-71.
Turnovsky, Stephen J., Macroeconomic Analysis and Stabilization Policies.
Cambridge University Press, 1977.Footnotes
1.Many ofthere are included in Gordon (1974) and Stein (1976). The modelstypically
assume that consumption or private expenditure depends directly upon private wealth,
with government debt included as a component of the latter. See, for example, Brunner
and Meltzer (1976, p. 72). In these models, then, a bond-financed tax reduction
directly increases aggregate demand.
2. This statement presumes that intergenerational transfers are operative. A discussion
of ciretmistances under which Barro's result is inapplicable is provided by Drazen(].978)
3. Recall that the analysis is intended to determine whether a case can reasonably be
made for the monetarist position.
4. My own arguments appear in McCallum (1980).
5. Barro (1974) (1981) argues that neglect of these complicating features does not serve
to distort the results in a predictable direction.
6. This assumption, it should be noted, plays an important role in theSargent-c.iallace
analysis.
7. Irrelevance of continued bond growth is assumed, withoutany utility-maximizing
justification, in McCalluin (1978).
8. The Sidrauski model is, of course, one in which bonds and money can easily co-exist
because real money balances appear as an argument of the household's within-period
utility function. The rationale for this appearance--which has been severely
criticized by Bryant and Wallace (1980) and others--is that transaction costs are
reduced by money balances, so that more preferred bundles of consumption and
leisure can be obtained. For a rather lengthy discussion of related issues, see
McCallum (1982).9. A notable feature of the Sidrauski model is the invariance of the steady-state
capital-labor ratio to expected inflation rates. This invariance (or super-
neutrality) does not survive minor modifications, such as making utility
dependent upon leisure. It is my impression that the superneutrality
property is not crucial for the issues under discussion here; the superneutral
version of the model has been adopted for simplicity.
10. The limiting procedure is a modification of one described by Sargent (1979,
pp. 333-335).
11.In this experiment (and those that follow) it is assumed that steady-state
values for k and in prevail in period 1. Since the crucial aspects of the
analysis involve limiting conditions, this simplification seems adequate for
the issues at hand.
12. It is true, as Gray and Salant (1981) have recently emphasized, that there are
some problems for which transversality conditions such as (lOb) are not
necessary for optimality. That the proposed path cannot be an equilibrium in
the case at hand can nevertheless be verified by observing that the repre-
sentative household could, in any period, reduce its bond holdings to zero
and obtain extra consumption in that period without reducing consumption in
any other period (and without altering any value of
13. According to our model.
14.Underthat hypothesis, the inflation rate will be zero.
15. Preliminary investigations with technical progress indicates that the results
remain valid in cases in which steady-state growth is possible. That the
use of income taxes, instead of head taxes, does not overturn the results is
implied by the analysis of the next section.
16. Given our definition of the interest rate, r1b is an approximation to
interest received in period t.17. Itis assumed that ¶> 0arid 1-Tr > 0.
18. The analysis also establishes that the presence of income taxes is consistent
with the results of Section III, as claimed in footnote 14.
19. These include Barro (1981), Siegel (1979), and Tobin (1980), among others.
20. Here and in the following tables, both budget and off-budget items are
included in the reported deficits while the conventional deficit concept,
is employed.
21. Robert Barro has emphasized that the model pertains to a closed economy;
the results might not obtain if migration were possible.